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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel A. Ligon-Bruno appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. On
appeal, Ligon-Bruno challenges the denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Shortly after midnight on January 4, 2010, officers received a report of a
possible burglary in progress at an apartment complex on Wyoming Avenue in
Hayden, Idaho. (Tr., Vol. I, p.9, L.11 - p.11, L.19, p.85, Ls.13-17, p.87, Ls.1618; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.3-7. 1) The reporting party indicated that he or she had
observed an unknown male crawl through an exterior window into Apartment No.
6.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.10, Ls.6-8; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.11-14.)

"Upon entering the

residence through the window, [the suspect] then opened the front door,
unscrewed a light bulb to make the area dark, [and] re-entered the residence"
through the front door.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.10, Ls.8-21; see also Tr., Vol. II, p.12,

Ls.14-16.) When officers arrived at the apartment complex, the suspect had just
exited the apartment "through the window he had entered into." (Tr., Vol. I, p.10,
Ls.10-12, 22-23.)

1

The appellate record contains two separately bound volumes of transcripts.
Consistent with the Appellant's brief, the volume containing the transcripts of the
6/18/10 and 6/23/10 suppression hearings, the 2/7/11 guilty plea hearing, and
the 3/23/11 sentencing hearing is cited herein as "Tr., Vol. I." The remaining
volume, consisting of the transcript of the 10/1/10 hearing at which the district
court pronounced its ruling on Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress, is cited herein
as "Tr., Vol. II."
1

Officers contacted the suspect, later identified as Gerard Steger, in the
parking lot area in front of the apartment complex. (Tr., Vol. I, p.13, L.21 - p.14,
L.10, p.88, L.7 - p.89, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.17-21.) Steger appeared be
"highly intoxicated." (Tr., Vol. I, p.89, Ls.22-24; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.21-22 .) He
said he lived in Apartment No. 6, but he did not have any identification that
confirmed his address.
L.1.)

2

(Tr., Vol. I, p.90, Ls.16-17; Tr., Vol. 11, p.12, L.25- p.13,

"[H]e stated several times that nobody else was present inside the

apartment" but then "changed his story to say that his roommates may be in the
apartment and then again changed it to say: 'No. They had already left."' (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.19, L.20-p.20, L.6, p.90, Ls.18-23; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.1-3.)
While one officer continued to question Steger, two others, Deputies
Franssen and Bixby, went to Apartment No. 6, which was located on the second
floor of the two-story apartment complex.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.15, L.16 - p.16, L.3,

p.90, L.24 - p.91, L.1; Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.5-8.) From outside of the apartment,
the officers observed that the front window was partially open. (Tr., Vol. I, p.16,
L.3 - p.17, L.1, p.91, Ls.7-11, p.92, Ls.19-22; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.8-9.) The
window was covered by mini-blinds, but lights were on in the apartment and
Deputy Bixby heard voices and other noises coming from inside.

(Tr., Vol. I,

p.16, Ls.3-15, p.17, Ls.10-13, p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.5, p.93, Ls.2-13, p.93, L.24 p.94, L.9; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.9-23.)

The officers also observed a "small

infrared-type security camera" positioned between the slats of the mini-blinds

2

One officer testified that Steger had a driver's license, but the license "showed
an address on Dakota, which [was] south of [the Wyoming Street] location by
several blocks." (Tr., Vol. I, p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.7.)
2

and "facing outwards toward the door area of the residence." (Tr., Vol. I, p.16,
The officers pounded on the door and

Ls.4-6, p.17, Ls.2-9, p.91, Ls.12-17.)

window of the apartment and loudly announced their presence in an attempt to
make contact with anyone inside.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.17, L.14 - p.18, L.10, p.93,

Ls.19-24, p.95, L.19- p.96, L.4; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.10-17.) After knocking for
approximately 60 to 90 seconds and receiving no response, Deputy Franssen
went back downstairs to ask Steger additional questions about the presence of
other individuals in the apartment and to attempt to ascertain whether Steger did,
in fact, live there.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.18, L.8 - p.19, L.5.)

At that point, Deputy

Franssen learned that central dispatch had called Steger's mother, who stated
that she knew Steger lived in an apartment on the north side of Wyoming
Avenue, but she was unable to provide any particular number and could not
identify which apartment complex it was. 3

(Tr., Vol. I, p.80, Ls.11-19, p.82,

Ls.10-20.)
While Deputy Franssen was downstairs talking to Steger, Deputies Bixby
and Ellis "maintained a visual" on the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.18, L.25 - p.19,
L.B.) The officers continued to knock and announce their presence for several
minutes, during which time Deputy Bixby heard voices coming from inside the
apartment.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.93, L.21 - p.95, L.4, p.96, Ls.2-4; Tr., Vol. 11, p.13,

Ls.17-20.) He also heard a "clanking" noise and "things getting shifted around."
(Tr., Vol. I, p.94, L.3 - p.95, L.15; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.20-23.) After 10 to 15

3

Deputy Franssen testified that the apartment complex in which Steger claimed
to live was on the north side of Wyoming Avenue and was one of two relatively
small apartment complexes on that particular block. (Tr., Vol. I, p.77, Ls.4-9.)
3

minutes of knocking and receiving no response, the officers slid open the window
and pushed the blinds out of the way to get a clear view into the apartment. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.96, Ls.2-16; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.1.)

The officers again

announced their presence and ordered any occupants out of the apartment.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.96, Ls.17-19.) Shortly thereafter, Ligon-Bruno "[p]eeked his head
out around the corner" of the hallway inside the apartment and asked what the
officers were doing there. (Tr., Vol. I, p.96, Ls.19-24; Tr., Vol. II, p.14, Ls.1-4.)
His eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and he appeared to be under the influence
of something.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.98, Ls.14-18; Tr., Vol. II, p.14, Ls.4-5.)

At the

officers' direction, Ligon-Bruno exited the apartment through the front window
and was then detained in handcuffs. (Tr., Vol. I, p.20, L.23 - p.23, L.24, p.98,
L.21 - p.99, L.13; Tr. Vol. II, p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.5.) Within seconds of asking
Ligon-Bruno whether there was anyone else inside the apartment, another
person, identified as Luca Trentino, emerged from the hallway. (Tr., Vol. I, p.23,
L.25 - p.25, L.6, p.100, Ls.2-1 0; Tr., Vol. II, p.15, Ls.6-10.) Trentino also exited
the apartment through the front window and was detained in handcuffs.

(Tr.,

Vol. I, p.25, Ls.4-6, p.100, Ls.2-10; Tr., Vol. II, p.15, Ls.6-10.)
After Ligon-Bruno and Trentino were secured on the balcony outside the
apartment, Deputy Bixby entered the apartment through the front window,
unlocked the front door and let Deputy Franssen inside. (Tr., Vol. I, p.45, L.18 p.47, L.4, p.57, Ls.7-22, p.100, L.11 - p.102, L.10.)

Both officers swept the

apartment to make sure there were no other people inside.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.26,

L.16 - p.27, L.2, p.58, Ls.17-20, p.101, L.12 - p.102, L.7; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.3-

4

10.) While in the apartment, the officers observed several items in plain view,
including roaches, burnt marijuana cigarettes, rolling papers, a homemade
marijuana pipe, numerous weapons - including a hatchet - a pile of watches and
other jewelry, and various small electronics. (Tr., Vol. I, p.27, L.3 - p.28, L.5,
p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.18; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, Ls.6-11.) The apartment smelled of
burnt marijuana.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.28, Ls.7-14, p.112, Ls.9-13; Tr., Vol. 11, p.17,

Ls.11-13.) The officers also heard the sound of a toilet continuously running; the
sound was coming from a bathroom near the same area from which Ligon-Bruno
and Trentino had emerged when they were ordered out of the apartment. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.16, p.104, L.19- p.105, L.14; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, Ls.1315.)
After conducting the initial sweep, the officers brought Ligon-Bruno,
Trentino and Steger back inside the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.29, L.22 - p.30,
L.4, p.102, Ls.15-19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.10-12.) Ligon-Bruno claimed to live in
the apartment and identified several items, including a cell phone, some small
electronics and a small black container, as his.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.30, L.5 - p.31,

L.25.) While Deputy Franssen questioned Ligon-Bruno, Deputy Bixby conducted
a more thorough sweep of the apartment, opening closet doors to make sure
nobody else was hiding in the apartment.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.30, L.5 - p.33, L.4,

p.102, L.17 - p.103, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.12-20.) The water in the toilet
continued to run during this time frame.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.33, L.8, p.104, L.21 -

p.105, L.4; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, Ls.13-15.)

Concerned about the potential

destruction of evidence, the officers lifted the lid on the tank of the toilet and

5

observed inside several bags of suspected controlled substances. (Tr., Vol. I,
p.33, L.8 - p.34, L.11, p.105, L.19 - p.106, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.18, Ls.18-24.)
Neither Deputy Bixby nor Deputy Franssen removed the items from the toilet
tank at that time. (Tr., Vol. I, p.106, Ls.10-19.)
After the second sweep, officers learned that Ligon-Bruno was on felony
probation for a cocaine charge. (Tr., Vol. I, p.35, L.1 - p.36, L.12; Tr., Vol. II,
p.19, Ls.11-14.) One of the officers contacted the probation department section
supervisor, Jarod Cash, and advised him that, while inside Ligon-Bruno's
apartment to investigate a possible burglary, officers had viewed in plain sight
evidence of illicit drug use. (Tr., Vol. I, p.36, Ls.13-16, p.126, L.19
p.128, Ls.17-23, p.137, L.18 - p.141, L.13.)

p.127, L.6,

Based upon that information,

Probation Officer Cash asked the officers to conduct a thorough search of the
apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.131, Ls.9-13, p.141, Ls.13-15, p.143, L.17-p.144, L.6;
Tr., Vol. II, p.20, Ls.10-11.) The officers did so and, in addition to the items they
had previously seen in plain sight, found other items consistent with the use and
sale of methamphetamine. (Tr., Vol. I, p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.24; Tr., Vol. 11, p.20,
Ls.17-22.)

The officers also retrieved the contents of the toilet tank, which

included two digital scales and, "approximately, 200 small, plastic Ziplock-type
bags, hyp[o]dermic needles, spoons, scrapers, straws.

Many items that are

consistent with the illicit use of narcotics." (Tr., Vo!. I, p.39, L.17-p.40, L.15.)
The state charged Ligon-Bruno with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver.

(R., pp.48-49.)

Ligon-Bruno moved to suppress the

evidence against him, arguing, inter alia, that the warrantless entries of his

6

apartment were without legal justification and violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution.

(R., pp.58-59, 62-69.)

He also argued that the evidence

seized pursuant to the probation search should be suppressed, contending that
the search was not a valid probation search and, but for the initial warrantless
entries, would not have occurred. (R., pp.95-96, 102-06.) Following a series of
evidentiary hearings and extensive briefing, the district court granted LigonBruno's motion insofar as it sought suppression of evidence obtained as a result
of a search of his cell phone, but it denied the motion in all other respects. (R.,
p.157.) As is relevant to this appeal, the district court found that the initial entry
of the apartment was justified by exigent circumstances and as a protective
sweep.

(Tr., Vol. II, p.14, Ls.6-21, p.16, Ls.3-24.)

The court found that the

second sweep of the apartment was not a reentry but was a constitutionally
reasonable continuation of the first sweep (Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.12 - p.17, L.3),
and that the lifting of the toilet lid during the continued sweep was justified by an
exigency because, under the circumstances, "[t]here was the distinct likelihood
that items of evidence were either being destroyed or in the water that was
running continuously in that tank of that toilet" (Tr., Vol. 11, p.18, L.24 - p.19, L. 7,
p.21, Ls.20-25).

Finally, the court found that the search of the apartment

pursuant to the probation officer's request was "constitutionally supportable
under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement." (Tr., Vol. II,
p.23, L.7 - p.26, L.25.)

7

After the district court entered its order on Ligon-Bruno's suppression
motion, the state amended its Information to charge Ligon-Bruno with felony
destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. (R., pp.176-77.) Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Ligon-Bruno entered a conditional guilty plea to the
amended charge, reserving the right to seek appellate review of the court's order
denying his motion to suppress.

(R., pp.174-75, 178-80.)

The district court

accepted the plea, imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years
fixed, suspended the sentence and placed Ligon-Bruno on probation for three
years.

(R., pp.186-91.)

Ligon-Bruno timely appeals.

(Augmentation).)

8

(Notice of Appeal

ISSUE
Ligon-Bruno states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's motion to
suppress evidence discovered during three warrantless searches of
his home because the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of
proving an exception to the warrant requirement?
(Appellant's brief, p.11.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Ligon-Bruno failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress?

9

ARGUMENT
Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Ligon-Bruno challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending

the district court erred in its conclusions that the entries and searches of his
apartment were justified by recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-21.)

Ligon-Bruno's arguments fail.

A review of the

record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that the
entries and searches were constitutionally reasonable under the exigent
circumstances, protective sweep and probation search exceptions to the warrant
requirement.

Even if Ligon-Bruno could show error, he has failed to establish

any basis for suppression because application of the law to the facts adduced at
the suppression hearing shows that the evidence in this case would have been
inevitably discovered.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

10

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
The Warrantless Entries And Searches At Issue Were Justified By
Recognized Exceptions To The Warrant Requirement
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article

I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures.

"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls

within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."
State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)); accord State v. RoiasTapia, 151 Idaho 479, _ , 259 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2011).

"When a

defendant has demonstrated that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, it
becomes the State's burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an
exception to the warrant requirement applied." State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554,
558, 21 P.3d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971 ); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,
218-19, 984 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1999); Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 481, 988 P.2d at
707); accord Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at_, 259 P.3d at 627. Contrary to LigonBruno's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the applicable law
supports the district court's determination that the state met its burden of proving
the existence of recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement with respect
to each warrantless entry and search in this case.

11

1.

Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's
Ruling That The Initial Entry Into The Apartment Was Justified By
Exigent Circumstances And As A Protective Sweep

The district court found that the officers' initial entry into Ligon-Bruno's,
apartment, after Ligon-Bruno and Trentino were detained outside the residence,
was justified by exigent circumstances and as a protective sweep. (Tr., Vol. II,
p.14, Ls.6-21, p.16, L.3 - p.17, L.3.) It is well settled that entries necessitated by
"exigent circumstances" do not offend the warrant requirement.

Michigan v.

Tyler, 436 U.S 499, 509 (1978); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224,
225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432,434,925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App.
1996). In determining whether exigent circumstances are present, the inquiry is
"whether the facts reveal 'a compelling need for official action and no time to
secure a warrant."' State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 624, 768 P.2d 1351, 1357
(Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). "The test for application of this
warrant exception is whether the facts as known to the [officer] at the time of the
entry, together with reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief
that an exigency justified the intrusion." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 136
P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d
214, 217 (Ct. App. 2003)); accord State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209
P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 470, 197
P.3d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2008). "A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of
danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling is one type
of exigency that may justify a warrantless entry." Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375, 209

12

P.3d at 672 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Reynolds, 146
Idaho at 470, 197 P.3d at 331).
A similar rationale underlies the protective sweep exception. A protective
sweep is justified "when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief
based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325, 337 (1990).

Although Buie involved an in-home arrest, the Idaho

Supreme Court has held that the exception applies even when the police have
merely detained a suspect outside the residence, "provided that the officers have
the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support the sweep."
State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 777-78, 992 P.2d 769, 772-73 (1999). As
explained by the Court of Appeals:
Police need not have actual knowledge or absolute proof that
someone is lurking in the house who poses a threat to the officers.
Revenaugh, 133 Idaho at 777, 992 P.2d at 772. After effecting an
arrest or detention at a residence, if the officers can point to
articulable facts, based upon their knowledge and experience, that
support their belief that others may be on the premises, the officers
can sweep the premises for other persons who might be in the
house. Id. Reasonable suspicion only requires articulable facts
and inferences supporting a reasonable belief.
State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 887, 994 P.2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 1999). "[T]he
type of offense suspected and the officers' experience with such offenses are
relevant factors when considering the threat potential to officers on the
premises." Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at_, 259 P.3d at 628 (citing Slater, 133
Idaho at 887, 994 P.2d at 630).
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In concluding that the officers' initial entry into Ligon-Bruno's apartment
was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement, the district court made the following, uncontested findings of fact:
At this point the police did not know whether the man who was
leaving the apartment belonged there. The police did not know
whether there was a burglary going on in process. They did not
know whether there were further perpetrators of a possible burglary
within that apartment. They did not know whether there were
potential victims of serious crime within that apartment who needed
immediate and serious care of law enforcement. They had exigent
circumstances to enter that apartment and find out if their presence
was needed for very serious reasons for the safety of citizens'
ongoing safety.
(Tr., Vol. 11, p.14, Ls.10-21.)

The court subsequently concluded, upon these

same facts, that the officers legitimately entered the apartment to conduct a
"safety sweep." (Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.3 - p.17, L.3.) The record supports the
district court's conclusions.
Before entering the apartment, officers had received a report of a potential
burglary in progress. (Tr., VoL I, p.9, L.11 - p.11, L.19, p.87, Ls.16-18; Tr., Vol.
II, p.12, Ls.3-7.) The reporting party indicated that a male subject had crawled

into the apartment through an exterior window, exited through the front door and
unscrewed a light bulb to make the area dark, and then re-entered the apartment
through the front door. (Tr., Vol. I, p.10, Ls.6-21; Tr., Vol. 11, p.12, Ls.11-16.) It
was late at night and the apartment complex was located in a neighborhood that
Deputy Franssen described as "not law enforcement friendly." (Tr., Vol. I, p.79,
Ls.4-5.) Both Deputy Franssen and Deputy Bixby testified that they and other
officers had responded to that particular apartment complex, and the one next to
it, multiple times to investigate reports of drug activity, domestic violence,
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burglaries and thefts. (Tr., Vol. I, p.77, Ls.2-17, p.86, L.12 - p.87, L.5; Tr., Vol.
II, p.12, Ls.3-11.) According to Deputy Franssen, "There's a lot of people in both
of those complexes that either have notations for being against law enforcement,
combative felons on state and local probation or parole" and, because of that,
"It's not a place where [they] send one officer to for 99 percent of the calls." (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.79, Ls.5-10.)
When officers arrived at the apartment complex, the burglary suspect had
just exited the apartment through the window and was walking towards the
parking lot. (Tr., Vol. I, p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.10, p.88, L.7 - p.89, L.19; Tr., Vol. II,
p.12, Ls.17-21.)

The suspect, identified as Steger, appeared to be "highly

intoxicated." (Tr., Vol. I, p.89, Ls.22-24; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.21-22.) He claimed
to live in the apartment that was the subject of the burglary call, but he did not
have any identification that confirmed his address. (Tr., Vol. I, p.14, L.18

p.15,

L.7, p.90, Ls.16-17; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, L.25- p.13, L.1.) He was also "vague and
inconsistent about whether there were other people in the apartment at that
time." (Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.1-4; see also Tr., Vol. I, p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.6, p.90,
Ls.18-23.) The officers went to the apartment and attempted for several minutes
to get the attention of anyone inside by loudly knocking and announcing their
presence. (Tr., Vol. I, p.17, L.14- p.18, L.10, p.93, L.19- p.96, L.4;

, Vol. 11,

p.13, Ls.5-17.) The lights were on inside the apartment, and Deputy Bixby could
hear noises, including voices and the sounds of items being moved, but no one
responded to the officers' knocking and commands. (Tr., Vol. I, p.17, Ls.10-13,
p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.5, p.93, L.2 - p.95, L.15; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.5-23.) It was
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only when Deputy Bixby slid open the window and moved the blinds that LigonBruno, and then Trentino, appeared and responded to the officers' orders to exit
the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.96, L.13 - p.100, L.1 0; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, L.24 - p.14,
L.4.)

Viewed in their totality, the above facts amply support the district court's
conclusion that the initial entry of the apartment, after Ligon-Bruno and Trentino
were detained, was justified by both the exigent circumstances and protective
sweep exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Given the report of a possible

burglary in progress late at night in a high-crime area, the fact that the suspect
had been seen entering and exiting the apartment through the window and
unscrewing the outside light bulb to make the area dark, the fact that Steger was
unable to produce any identification to confirm his address and made
inconsistent statements regarding whether anyone else was in the apartment,
the fact that officers heard voices and other suspicious noises coming from
inside the apartment but were unable to rouse anyone from the apartment
despite several minutes of loud knocking, and the fact that Ligon-Bruno and
Trentino procrastinated in responding to the officers' knocks and commands, the
police acted objectively reasonably in entering the apartment without a warrant,
both to ensure the safety and well-being of any potential victims and to dispel the
legitimate, articulable concern that there may be other individuals in the
apartment who posed a threat to the officers' safety.
Ligon-Bruno challenges the district court's conclusion that the initial entry
was justified, contending that "once Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca [Trentino] had
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been removed from the apartment, there was no reason for the police to believe
that anyone else was still inside." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) This argument fails to
show error because, even if Ligon-Bruno and Trentino had claimed that there
was no one else inside the residence, law enforcement would not have been
required to accept those claims at face value. Roias-Tapia, 151 Idaho at_,
259 P.3d at 628 ("[O]fficers need not have actual knowledge or absolute proof
that someone is lurking in the place to be searched who poses a threat to the
officers.") (emphasis original) (citations omitted); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136
Idaho 847, 850, 41 P.3d 275, 278 (Ct. App. 2001) (officers responding to a 911
hang-up call not required to conclude need for help dissipated based solely on
explanation from person who greeted them upon their arrival); Saifas, 129 Idaho
at 435, 925 P.2d at 1134 (officers not required to take at face value domestic
violence victim's assurances that "everything is fine").
This is not a case like State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct.
App. 1986), relied upon by Ligon-Bruno, where police effectuated a warrantless
entry of a home to investigate the homeowner's report of an intruder, despite the
homeowner's request before the entry to "just forget it." In that case, the Court
held that "[t]he initial report of an intruder, uncorroborated by other facts, is
insufficient to overcome a homeowner's right to say 'forget it"' and, as such, did
not justify the warrantless entry.

Rusho, 110 Idaho at 560, 716 P.2d at 1332.

Here, in contrast, it was not the homeowner but a third party who called the
police to

report the

suspicious

activity,

and the report was far from

uncorroborated. When police responded, they were unable to confirm whether
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the first suspect lived at the apartment that was the subject of the burglary ca11

4

and whether there were others in the apartment. When officers attempted to
make contact with the occupants of the apartment they heard voices and noises
consistent with items being moved around, but the two suspects who were
eventually detained, Ligon-Bruno and Trentino, procrastinated for several
minutes in responding to the officers' commands to open the door.
Given the nature of the report and the suspicious circumstances attendant
thereto, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to believe that a crime had
been committed and that there may be other individuals in the apartment who
were either in need of assistance or who posed a danger to the officers and
others. Indeed, at least with respect to the protective sweep justification for the
entry, the fact "that officers in this case did not know how many people were on
the premises supports the finding of articulable suspicion that they may be in
danger since they had no way of determining that all persons were present and
accounted for."

Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at _, 259 P.3d at 628-29 (citation

4

Ligon-Bruno asserts that, before entering the apartment, "the police had
already verified via Mr. Steger's mother, that he lived in one of the less than thirty
apartments on that block." (Appellant's brief, p.17 (citing Tr. Vol. I, p.80, Ls.319).) The cited material does not support this assertion. Regarding whether
Steger's mother was able to confirm Steger's address, Deputy Franssen
testified: "[S]he was able to provide that she knew that he lived in an apartment
across from Ziggy's, which is on the south side of Wyoming but no particular
number or couldn't even identify to the best of my knowledge which apartment
complex it was." (Tr., Vol. I, p.80, Ls.15-19.) Deputy Franssen testified that the
apartment that was the subject of the burglary call was in one of two apartment
complexes in a single block "on the north side of Wyoming Avenue between 95
and Government." (Tr., Vol. I, p.76, L.24 - p.77, L.9.) However, there was no
testimony or other evidence that those complexes were across from or even in
the same vicinity as the "Ziggy's" referred to by Steger's mother.
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mitted).

Ligon-Bruno has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion

that the initial warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances and as a
protective sweep.

2.

Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's
Conclusion That The Second Sweep Of The Apartment Was Not A
Reentry But Was A Constitutionally Reasonable Continuation Of
The Protective Sweep

After conducting the initial sweep and observing weapons, drugs,
paraphernalia and other suspicious items in plain view, officers escorted LigonBruno and Trentino back inside the apartment.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.58, L.17 - p.59,

L.7, p.101, L.12 - p.102, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.3-12.) Thereafter, Deputy
Bixby conducted a more thorough walk-through of the apartment, looking in the
bedroom closets to make sure nobody else was hiding in the residence. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.102, L.17- p.103, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.12-20.) During this second
walk-through, Deputies Bixby and Franssen lifted the lid on the tank of the toilet,
in which water had been continuously running since the officers first entered the
apartment, and observed inside the tank several bags of suspected controlled
substances. (Tr., Vol. I, p.33, L.8 - p.34, L.11, p.105, L.19 - p.106, L.19; Tr.,
Vol. II, p.18, Ls.18-24.)
The district court ruled with respect to the second walk-through of the
apartment and the opening of closet doors that such was not a reentry of the
apartment but was instead a constitutionally reasonable continuation of the initial
protective sweep. Specifically, the court ruled:
Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Mr. Trentino were brought back into the
apartment at that point. And the testimony was that, and this was
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an interesting phrase for the Court, a more thorough visual sweep
of the same rooms were done, including closets and bedrooms.
I'm not sure what a visual sweep is other than potentially one using
their eyes to sweep the room. But it looks like the deputies went
back through the house to some degree, but they went to different
places, into the closets and into the bedrooms, to see if there were
other individuals there.
The Court finds that to be not necessarily a reentry of the
house. The police are already in the house. They are already
conducting a safety sweep of that house. And just the fact that
they bring the suspects into the house and then continue that
safety sweep in a bit more detail does not mean that there was a
reentry or that the safety sweep had lost its legitimacy and
importance.
The further, more detailed safety sweep was
legitimate under the circumstances, and the Court finds it to be
constitutionally supportable.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.10 - p.17, L.5.) The court also ruled that the lifting of the
toilet tank lid during the continued sweep was justified by an exigency because,
under the circumstances, "[t]here was the distinct likelihood that items of
evidence were either being destroyed or in the water that was running
continuously in the tank of that toilet." (Tr., Vol. II, p.18, L.24 - p.19, L.7, p.21,
Ls.20-25.)
On appeal, Ligon-Bruno does not appear to challenge the district court's
determination that the officers had reason to believe, based on the continuous
running of water in the toilet tank and their prior observations of illegal activity in
the residence, that items of evidence were potentially being destroyed. Instead,
he argues that the court erred in concluding that the second walk-through of the
apartment was justified as a continuation of the protective sweep (Appellant's
brief, pp.19-21) and, he contends, the contents of the toilet tank should be
suppressed (or, at the very least, could not have contributed to the justification
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for the subsequent probation search) because "it was not until the second search
had begun that officers became concerned about the running of the toilet"
(Appellant's brief, p.21 (citation omitted)). Ligon-Bruno's argument fails because
the record and the applicable law support the district court's determination that
the second, more thorough walk-through of the apartment was justified as a
continuation of the protective sweep.
As previously explained, a protective sweep is a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement and is justified when there are "articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325, 334 (1990).

Officers executing a protective sweep "need not have

actual knowledge or absolute proof that someone is lurking in the house who
poses a threat to the officers." State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 887, 994 P.2d
625, 630 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 777, 992
P.2d 769, 772 (1999)). Rather, the reasonable suspicion standard requires only
"articulable facts and inferences supporting a reasonable belief."

Slater, 133

Idaho at 887, 994 P.2d at 630. When such facts exist, "officers can sweep the
premises for other persons who might be in the house."

kl

(citing Revenaugh,

133 Idaho at 777, 992 P.2d at 772). The sweep must, however, "be narrowly
confined to a 'cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found'"
and must "last 'no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of
danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and
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depart the premises."' State v. Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho 479, _ , 259 P.3d 625,
627 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting

494 U.S. at 335-36).

Application of the above legal principles to the facts of this case supports
the district court's determination that Deputy Bixby's second walk-through of the
apartment was a constitutionally permissible continuation of the initial protective
sweep. The facts justifying the initial sweep are detailed in Section C.1, supra,
and need not be repeated here.

In light of the circumstances confronting the

officers at the time of the initial sweep - e.g., the report of a possible burglary in
progress late at night in a high-crime area, the inability to confirm Steger's
address or to ascertain from him whether other people were present inside the
apartment, the sound of voices and other suspicious noises coming from inside
the apartment, and the failure of Ligon-Bruno and Trentino to promptly respond
to the officers' knocks and commands - there can be little question that the
officers would have been justified during their initial sweep to look in the
bedroom closets in search of persons who might pose a threat to them. See
Buie, 494 U.S. at 335 (officers conducting protective sweep may make "cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found"); Rojas-Tapia, 151
Idaho at

259 P.3d

at 627 (same). Although Ligon-Bruno argues otherwise,

that the officers did not initially do so is of no constitutional significance.
As noted by the district court, the officers were already legitimately in the
house to conduct a protective sweep, "[a]nd just the fact that they bring the
suspects into the house and then continue that safety sweep in a bit more detail
does not mean that there was a reentry or that the safety sweep had lost its
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legitimacy and importance." (Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.3.)

In fact, the

importance of conducting a full sweep of the apartment was actually heightened
after the initial sweep because it was during the first sweep that officers saw
evidence of illegal drug activity and "numerous weapons" - including baseball
bats, knives and a hatchet - "throughout the house." (Tr., Vol. I, p.103, L.22 p.104, L.5; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, L.6-20.) Together with the information the officers
already knew before entering the apartment for the first time, these observations
supplied the officers with a constitutionally reasonable basis to conduct the more
thorough sweep to look in closets where other persons posing a threat to the
officers might be found. See Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at _ , 259 P.3d at 628
(considering potential presence of weapons as factor and upholding protective
sweep of building in relatively close proximity to area where suspects were
detained where "officers had no knowledge as to the number of people on the
premises, nor had any information that would relieve their concerns that any
other persons on the premises were armed"); Slater, 133 Idaho at 887-88, 994
P.2d at 630-31 (reasonable for officers investigating suspected drug activity to
believe, after knocking and announcing presence without any answer and seeing
suspects run and hide, that there were potentially others inside the residence
could have easily secreted themselves in the area swept).
On appeal, Ligon-Bruno relies on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978),
to support his argument that the district court erred in its conclusion that the
second walk-through of the apartment was justified as a continuation of the
protective sweep. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Mincey, however, is both legally
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and factually inapposite.

Mincey is an exigent circumstance case and,

unsurprisingly, does not discuss or even cite to the legal requirements for a
protective sweep, an exception to the warrant requirement that was first
addressed by the Supreme Court in Buie, supra, 12 years after Mincey was
decided.

Nor do the facts of Mincey bear any resemblance to the facts that

justified the continued protective sweep in this case.

In Mincey homicide

investigators, having already located all of the persons in Mincey's apartment,
nevertheless conducted a four-day warrantless search of the apartment "that
included opening drawers and ripping up carpets." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. In
contrast, the officers in this case conducted a cursory inspection of LigonBruno's apartment and, with the exception of the toilet (the opening of which was
independently justified by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, see
Section C.3, infra), limited their search to only those spaces where persons
posing a threat to them may be found. In short, nothing about Mincey supports
Ligon-Bruno's claim of error in relation to the district court's ruling that the
second walk-through was a constitutionally reasonable continuation of the initial
protective sweep.
As further support for his claim that "there was no basis for the additional
warrantless search of his home that occurred [after] the deputies took Mr. LigonBruno and the two other detainees inside the apartment," Ligon-Bruno points to
Deputy Bixby's testimony on cross-examination. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) When
asked by defense counsel, "[W)hat indications did you find [during the initial
sweep] that would lead you to believe that someone else was armed or
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dangerous or anything like that inside the residence," Deputy Bixby responded,
"Nothing. That's what a safety sweep is. You go in, check the residence, come
back out."

(Tr., Vol. I, p.121, L.20 - p.122, L.2.)

According to Ligon-Bruno,

Deputy Bixby's statement conclusively demonstrates that officers did not have
any reasonable basis to conduct a more detailed sweep for the presence of
other potentially dangerous individuals in the apartment.

(Appellant's brief,

p.20.) Ligon-Bruno is incorrect for two reasons.
First, read in context and in light of the officer's prior testimony regarding
the circumstances that unfolded when officers arrived at the apartment to
investigate the report of a possible burglary in progress, Deputy Bixby's
testimony on cross-examination can only reasonably be construed as meaning
that, after the initial entry, he did not have any more or less reason to believe that
others might be present in the apartment who might pose a threat to the officers.
In light of the fact that the officers had a sufficient level of reasonable, articulable
suspicion that would have entitled the officers to look in the bedroom closets
upon their initial entry, it is of no consequence that Deputy Bixby personally
believed that the initial entry did not provide any additional facts upon which to
ultimately conduct a cursory inspection of those closets.
Second, even if Deputy Bixby's testimony on cross-examination could be
construed as a definitive statement that, after the initial sweep, he did not
personally believe that "someone else was armed or dangerous" inside the
apartment, such statement does not establish that the continued sweep was
unlavrful. The applicability of the protective sweep exception does not depend
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on the subjective beliefs of one officer, but turns instead on an objective test that
is satisfied when there "articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to
those on the arrest scene." Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Again, the facts known to the
officers at the time of the initial entry, combined with the additional fact that the
officers observed weapons and evidence of drug activity during the initial sweep,
provided the officers with an objectively reasonable basis to continue the
protective sweep to check for other persons who might harm the officers. LigonBruno has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that the second
walk-through of the apartment and the opening of closet doors was a
constitutionally permissible continuation of the initial protective sweep.

3.

Regardless Of The Legality Of The Second Sweep, Officers Were
Justified By Exigent Circumstances In Lifting The Lid Of The Toilet
Tank To Prevent The Destruction Of Evidence

"Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement,
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence is justification for what would
otherwise be illegal police conduct." State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 748, 692
P.2d 1174, 1180 (1984); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)
(imminent risk of destruction of evidence is an exigency that justifies a
warrantless search); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383
(Ct. App. 2006) (same); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 559, 716 P.2d 1328,
1331 (Ct. App. 1986) (same). In order for the this exception to apply, the police
must have probable cause to believe that evidence is present in the place to be
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searched and must also possess "a reasonable belief that unless they act, the
evidence will be destroyed." Hoak, 107 Idaho at 748-49, 692 P.2d at 1180-81
(footnote omitted); accord Rusho, 110 Idaho at 559, 716 P.2d at 1331 (citing
Mincey, 437 U.S. 385) ("Probable cause and a compelling emergency, such as
imminent destruction of evidence ... must be shown.").
Applying theses principles in this case, the district court ruled that the
officers were justified by exigent circumstances in lifting the lid of the toilet tank
to prevent the possible destruction of evidence. Specifically, the court reasoned:
The police also - again I come back to the sound of the
toilet.
The police noticed that the toilet had been running
continuously for a several-minute period and lifted up the lid of the
tank of the toilet and in doing so found plastic bags that the Court
would probably learn if this matter goes to trial contained some of
the drugs that are part of this allegation. The Court finds that it was
reasonable for the police to lift the lid of that toilet to find out what
was going on under exigent circumstances, given the
circumstances of seeing the paraphernalia and the smell of burning
marijuana and a continuously running toilet. There was a distinct
likelihood that items of evidence were either being destroyed or in
the water that was running continuously in the tank of that toilet.
(Tr., Vol. II, p.18, L.18 - p.19, L.7; see also p.21, Ls.20-24 (finding "the items in
the particular toilet tank were found pursuant to an exigent circumstances [sic] of
possible destruction of evidence and it was appropriate for the police to lift the lid
of that tank").) This ruling is supported by the record which shows that, before
entering the apartment, Deputy Bixby heard things being moved around and a
"clanking" sound coming from the general area in the apartment where the
bathroom is located. (Tr., Vol. I, p.93, L.19 - p.95, L.18, p.104, L.21 - p.105,
L.7.) While performing their initial sweep of the apartment, officers detected the
smell of burnt marijuana, observed burnt marijuana cigarettes and drug
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paraphernalia, and heard the sound of water continuously running in the toilet
(Tr., Vol. I, p.27, L.3 - p.28, L. 18, p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.15, p.104, L.21 - p.105,
L.5, p.112, Ls.3-13; Tr., Vol. 11, p.17, Ls.8-15.)

In addition, Deputy Franssen

testified that, in his experience, "toilets are commonly used to conceal or destroy
evidence because of the very nature of it being water.

Anything that's water

soluble can be lost." (Tr., Vol. I, p.33, Ls.20-24.) Taken together, these facts
supplied the officers with probable cause to believe that drugs were present and
that, unless they acted, items of evidence would be destroyed.
As noted in Section C.2, supra, Ligon-Bruno does not appear to challenge
district court's determination that the officers had reason to believe, based on the
continuous running of water in the toilet tank and their observations of illegal
drug activity in the residence, that items of evidence were potentially being
destroyed. Rather, he claims only that the contents of the toilet tank should be
suppressed because officers only "became concerned about the running toilet"
during the second protective sweep, which Ligon-Bruno claims was unlawful.
(Appellant's brief, pp.20-21.) Ligon-Bruno is incorrect.

Both Deputy Franssen

and Deputy Bixby testified that they heard the toilet running upon their initial
entry into the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.28, Ls.17-18, p.104, L.19 - p.105, L.4.}
Deputy Franssen continued to hear the toilet running while questioning LigonBruno in the front room of the apartment and at that point believed "because of
1

the area that the [suspects] had come from as well as the continuous running of
the toilet, that the toilet had been used to destroy evidence." (Tr., Vol. I, p.28,
Ls.18-24, p.33, Ls.5-11.) Thus, while the officers did not lift the toilet tank lid
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until the second sweep, they were actually in possession of all the facts giving
rise to the exigency as a result of their initial entry.

Regardless of the legality of

the second sweep, Ligon-Bruno has failed to show error in the district court's
ruling that the lifting of the toilet tank lid was justified by exigent circumstances.

4.

Even Assuming The Continued Sweep And Lifting Of The Toilet
Tank Lid Were Unlawful, Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Any
Basis For Suppression Because The Evidence In This Case Would
Have Been Inevitably Discovered Pursuant To A Valid Probation
Search

With the exception of the contents of Ligon-Bruno's cell phone, which the
district court suppressed (Tr., Vol. II, p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.9), all of the evidence in
this case was seized pursuant to a probation search. The district court ruled that
the probation search was lawful, both because Ligon-Bruno had consented as a
term of his probation agreement to submit to searches of his residence upon the
request of his probation officer,

5

and because the information the police

conveyed to the probation officer regarding their observations of illegal activity at
Ligon-Bruno's apartment gave the probation officer reasonable grounds to
believe that Ligon-Bruno was in violation of his probation. (Tr., Vol. II, p.19, L.8 p.20, L.9, p.23, L.7 - p.26, L.25.) Ligon-Bruno does not challenge the court's
determination that the search conducted at the probation officer's request met
the legal requirements of a valid probation search. Instead, he argues solely that
the probation search "was not lawful because it was only authorized as a result

5

The district court took judicial notice of three documents from Kootenai County
Criminal Case No. 05-17960 that together set forth the conditions of LigonBruno's probation. (Tr., Vol. I, p.144, L.12 - p.147, L.11.) The order imposing
the conditions of probation is contained in the appellate record at pages 87-96.
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of the discovery of contraband during the initial unlawful searches, thereby
rendering any evidence discovered as a result fruit of the poisonous tree."
(Appellant's brief, p.21.)

Ligon-Bruno has failed to show any basis for

suppression because, as set forth above, the record and the applicable law
support the district court's conclusions that each entry and search was justified
by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.

Even assuming the

second walk-through of the apartment and the lifting of the toilet tank lid were
unlawful, all of the evidence in this case would have been inevitably discovered
pursuant to the valid probation search based on the officers' observations during
the initial constitutionally permissible protective sweep.
The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.
See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 (Ct.
App. 2002).

Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of proof

that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful means,
then exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained by
constitutionally improper means.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984);

Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001).

The

underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution
in the same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a
worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at
813.
Here, there can be no question that the evidence seized pursuant to the
probation search would have been lawfully discovered even if officers had not
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conducted a second walk-through of the apartment and lifted the toilet tank lid.
After detaining Ligon-Bruno and ascertaining his identity, officers learned from
central dispatch that Ligon-Bruno was on felony probation.
Ls.5-7.)

(Tr., Vol. I, p.35,

They contacted the probation department and advised the section

supervisor that they were inside Ligon-Bruno's apartment to investigate a
possible burglary and had observed in plain view evidence of illicit drug activity.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.36, Ls.13-16, p.126, L.19-p.127, L.6, p.128, Ls.17-23, p.137, L.18
- p.141, L.13.)

Even assuming officers had not conducted a second walk-

through and lifted the toilet tank lid, the evidence of illegal drug use the officers
observed during their initial constitutionally permissible protective sweep would
have been sufficient by itself to justify the ensuing probation search. See United
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (probation search based on reasonable
suspicion that the probationer is in violation of his probation is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d
635, 638-39 (2004) (same); State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240,
242 (Ct. App. 2008) (same).

Because the evidence in this case would have

been inevitably discovered pursuant to that valid probation search, Ligon-Bruno
has failed to show any error in the denial of his motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfu!ly requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
district court's order denying Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress.
DATED this 1ih day of February 2012.
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